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ABSTRACT. This paper explores the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis in the 
philosophy of mind for contemporary epistemology. In particular, it argues that all theories of 
knowledge need to accommodate the ability intuition that knowledge involves cognitive 
ability, but that once this requirement is understood correctly there is no reason why one 
could not have a conception of cognitive ability that was consistent with the extended 
cognition thesis. There is thus, surprisingly, a straightforward way of developing our current 
thinking about knowledge such that it incorporates the extended cognition thesis.   
 
 
0. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
One of the most interesting proposals in the recent literature in the philosophy of mind has 
been the suggestion that there is no in principle bar to cognitive processes extending beyond 
the skin of the agent. As one of the foremost exponents of this thesis has expressed the 
matter, “cognitive processes are not located exclusively inside the skin of cognizing 
organism” (Rowlands 1999, p22). This is the so-called extended cognition thesis. This thesis 
poses a radical challenge to our normal theorising about cognition which largely takes it as 
given that cognitive processes take place exclusively under the skin of the agent. Indeed, 
insofar as one treats cognitive processes as mental processes, then the extended cognition 
thesis generates a more radical conclusion stillviz., that the mind can extend beyond the 
skin of the agent too (the extended mind thesis). Even so, there does seem to be some very 
strong support available for the extended cognition thesis, and so it is a proposal that must be 
taken seriously, not only by philosophers but also by anyone working in a research field 
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which is concerned with the nature of cognition, such as psychology, linguistics and 
informatics.1 
Given the wealth of literature that has been generated by the extended cognition thesis 
in the philosophy of mind (not to mention in other fields outwith philosophy, such as 
informatics), it is puzzling that so little has been done to explore the epistemological 
ramifications of this proposal, especially since this is clearly a thesis which has important 
implications for epistemology. The aim of this paper is to try to rectify this by examining 
how the theory of knowledge might accommodate this proposal. As we will see, far from 
being an uncomfortable fit with contemporary thinking about knowledge, there is in fact a 
key thread in current epistemologyregarding the relationship between cognitive ability and 
knowledgewhich fits quite snugly with the extended cognition thesis. Indeed, reflecting on 
the relationship between knowledge and cognitive ability may arguably offer some additional 
support for the extended cognition thesis. 
 
 
1. KNOWLEDGE AND COGNITIVE ABILITY 
 
One of the master intuitions about knowledge which guides contemporary epistemology is 
the idea that knowledge is the product of cognitive ability. A true belief, no matter what else 
of epistemic relevance can be offered in its favour (e.g., that it is safe, sensitive, backed by 
reasons, epistemically blameless, and so on), will not count as a case of knowledge if it is not 
the product of cognitive ability. Call this the ability intuition. 
Consider, for example, an agent who is, unbeknownst to her, a brain in a vat (BIV) 
who is being ‘fed’ beliefs about her environment by supercomputers. Such an agent might 
nonetheless form true beliefs about her environment. Moreover, those true beliefs so formed 
may well be modally stable in the relevant ways across a range of possible worlds such that 
they are both safe (i.e., they could not easily have been false) and sensitive (i.e., were the 
proposition believed to be false, then the agent would no longer have believe it).2 The beliefs 
might well have additional epistemically relevant properties too, such as being backed by 
good reasons (and so justified, in an epistemically internalist sense at least) and epistemically 
blameless (in that no epistemic norm is being intentionally, or at least culpably, flouted).3 
Even so, no-one in contemporary epistemology supposes that these true beliefs can amount to 
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knowledge, and the most natural explanation of why is that the fact that these beliefs are true 
in no way reflects the cognitive abilities of the agent. After all, despite the best cognitive 
efforts of the agent, the reason why her beliefs are true has nothing at all to do with these 
cognitive efforts, and reflects instead merely the work of the supercomputers. 
In crediting an agent with knowledge we are thus, amongst other things, crediting her 
with having a relevant cognitive ability which played some key part in the production of the 
target true belief. An adequacy condition on any theory of knowledge is thus that it is able to 
accommodate the ability intuition. This entails that all theories of knowledge should include 
an ability condition of some sort (i.e., an epistemic condition which can accommodate the 
ability condition), or should at least include an epistemic condition which, amongst other 
things, does the work of an ability condition. Inevitably, there has been some debate about 
what constitutes a cognitive ability and thus regarding how strong the ability condition on 
knowledge should be.  
One might think that a cognitive ability is simply a belief-forming process which is 
reliable (i.e., more likely, by a significant margin, to generate true beliefs rather than false 
beliefs). This account of cognitive ability is, however, too weak. This is because one can 
formulate cases where agents have formed true beliefs via reliable belief-forming processes 
but where the reliability in question does not reflect a cognitive ability on the part of the 
agent. Indeed, we can use the BIV case just noted to make this point, since we can stipulate 
that the supercomputers only ‘feed’ true beliefs to the agent concerned. To take a simple 
illustration, suppose that our hero is only fed beliefs about the current time (GMT) and the 
location of the British Prime Minister, but that these beliefs are always true. In the relevant 
sense such beliefs are reliable, in that they are indeed more likely to be true than false 
(indeed, they are pretty much guaranteed to be true). But this is not a case of knowledge, and 
the primary reason for this is that such reliability does not reflect a cognitive ability on the 
part of the agent. 
Note that the problem here is not simply that we are dealing with a sceptical scenario 
(i.e., one designed to call the agent’s knowledge into question en masse), since we can run 
similar examples which lack this feature. One such case is that of ‘Temp’, who regularly 
forms his beliefs about the temperature in the room by consulting a thermometer on the wall. 
Unbeknownst to Temp, however, he is looking at a faulty thermometer which is randomly 
fluctuating within a given range. Nonetheless, his beliefs so formed are reliable because 
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(again unbeknownst to him) there is someone hidden in the room next to the thermostat who 
every time she sees Temp head towards the thermometer adjusts the thermostat so that the 
temperature of the room corresponds to the reading on the thermometer. Accordingly, 
Temp’s way of forming his beliefs is highly reliable. Clearly, however, Temp does not know 
the temperature of the room, and the reason for this is that his reliability does not reflect his 
cognitive ability at all, but merely the helpful assistance of the hidden helper.4 
In both the Temp and the BIV case the source of the reliability is external to the skin 
of the agent, and so one might think that this is crucial to these cases such that so long as the 
source of the reliability is under the agent’s skin then that would suffice to ensure that the 
agent’s true beliefs so formed are the result of her cognitive ability, and hence in the market 
(on this score at least) for knowledge. Interestingly, however, we can easily imagine a case 
which has the relevant features as the Temp and BIV examples but where the source of the 
reliability is under the skin of the agent. Consider, for example, ‘Alvin’ who has an unusual 
brain lesion, a guaranteed side-effect of which is that it prompts him to randomly, but 
reliably, form true beliefs about the product of fairly complicated arithmetical sums. So 
described, this is certainly a reliable belief-forming trait that Alvin has, and yet intuitively 
Alvin does not have knowledge of these mathematical propositions. As in the Temp and BIV 
cases, the primary reason for this is that it clearly has nothing to do with Alvin’s cognitive 
abilities that his beliefs in this regard are true, but is instead a fortunate consequence of the 
otherwise unfortunate fact that he has a brain lesion. In short, Alvin’s true beliefs in the target 
propositions do not satisfy the ability intuition.5 Nonetheless, the source of the reliability of 
Alvin’s belief-forming process is clearly beneath his skin. 
So if one is to capture the requirement that knowledge involves a true belief that is 
due to cognitive ability, a mere appeal to the reliability of the target belief-forming 
processeven where the source of that reliability lies under the skin of the agentwill not 
suffice. So what in addition is required for a genuine cognitive ability to be manifested? As a 
number of epistemologists have noted, the answer to this question lies in the extent to which 
the reliable belief-forming process is integrated within, and therefore a part of, the cognitive 
character of the agent, where an agent’s cognitive character is her integrated web of stable 
and reliable belief-forming processes.6 In particular, what is required is that the reliable 
belief-forming process in question needs to be sufficiently integrated within the agent’s 
cognitive character such that one would—to a significant degree anyway—credit the 
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cognitive success (i.e., the true belief) that results to the agent’s cognitive agency rather than 
to some other factor. As we will now see, however, there are two main proposals put forward 
in this regard in the recent literature, and so in order to explore this matter further we first 
need to state these two views. 
 
 
2. STRONG AND WEAK ACCOUNTS OF COGNITIVE AGENCY 
 
We can formulate these two accounts of cognitive agencyspecifically, of the relationship 
between cognitive ability and knowledgethat can be found in the recent literature as 
follows: 
 
(COGAWEAK) If S knows that p, then S’s true belief that p is the product of a reliable belief-forming 
process which is appropriately integrated within S’s cognitive character such that her 
cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to her cognitive agency. 
 
(COGASTRONG) S knows that p iff S’s true belief that p is the product of a reliable belief-forming 
process which is appropriately integrated within S’s cognitive character such that her 
cognitive success is primarily creditable to her cognitive agency. 
 
Note that both these theses in effect treat the question of the extent to which the cognitive 
success is creditable to the agent’s cognitive agency as being the test by which one 
determines whether it should count as the product of cognitive ability. More generally, on 
both views one can use this test to determine whether a reliable belief-forming process is 
appropriately integrated within an agent’s cognitive character such that it counts as a bona 
fide cognitive ability.7 Where the two accounts differ is on the extent to which the cognitive 
success in question is creditable to the agent’s cognitive agency. Whereas the strong account, 
(COGASTRONG), insists on a very demanding relationship between cognitive success and 
cognitive agency on this score, such that knowledge can be defined in terms of the 
satisfaction of this relationship, the weaker account, (COGAWEAK), allows other factors to be 
substantively relevant to one’s acquisition of knowledge. 
 It should be clear that both accounts of the relationship between knowledge and 
cognitive agency can explain why agents like Temp and Alvin lack knowledge. In the former 
case it is not Temp’s cognitive agency which is producing his cognitive success, but rather a 
feature of the environment (i.e., the activities of his ‘helper’). Accordingly, we do not credit 
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Temp’s cognitive success to his cognitive agency to any significant degree, and hence he fails 
to satisfy both (COGASTRONG) and (COGAWEAK). The case of Alvin is different, in that it is 
not a feature of the environment which is the source of Alvin’s cognitive success but rather a 
feature of his brain, but the essential point is the same. After all, it has nothing to do with 
Alvin’s cognitive agency that he is forming true beliefs in this fashion, and hence he also fails 
to satisfy both (COGASTRONG) and (COGAWEAK). Indeed, we would naturally say that is in 
spite of Alvin’s cognitive agency that he is cognitively successful in this regard. So even 
where the source of one’s cognitive success lies under the skin of the agent, it can still be the 
case that the source of that cognitive success lies outwith the agent’s cognitive agency.  
Where these two accounts of the relationship between knowledge and cognitive 
agency will come apart will be in terms of what they would demand of the agents in the 
Temp and Alvin cases before they could count as having knowledge of the target 
propositions. That is, they will hold conflicting accounts of what Temp and Alvin would need 
to do to integrate their reliable belief-forming processes within their cognitive character. For 
now, let us focus on what the strong account would require in this regard, since what suffices 
for the strong account will a fortiori also suffice for the weak account as well (we will return 
to consider weaker accounts of cognitive integration below). What would clearly suffice in 
this regard would be if the agent concerned were to come to know both what the true source 
of the reliability of his belief-forming process was and that it was reliable.8 
For example, suppose that Temp became appropriately aware that he had a helper in 
this way, perhaps initially through the testimony of a trustworthy informant and then 
subsequently by covertly observing the helper in action. Temp thus comes to know not just 
that the reading on the thermometer is a reliable indicator of the ambient temperature, but 
also gains knowledge of why this is the case even despite the fact that the thermometer is 
broken. Would this make a difference to the epistemic standing of Temp’s beliefs? 
Intuitively, it would, in that Temp could now come to know what the temperature of the room 
is by observing the reading on the thermometer. But notice that it is also now true of Temp 
that his cognitive success is primarily creditable to his cognitive agency. After all, Temp is 
now able to take cognitive responsibility for this cognitive success. In becoming aware of the 
relevant facts, then, this hitherto merely reliable belief-forming process becomes integrated 
within Temp’s cognitive character, such that his cognitive success is now primarily creditable 
to his cognitive agency. In this way, mere reliability in his belief-forming process is 
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converted into the exercise of a genuine cognitive ability, one that can in principle deliver 
knowledge.  
The same goes for the case of Alvin. For now suppose that Alvin becomes aware that 
there exists brain lesions of this sort, and gains additional good grounds for supposing that he 
possesses just such a brain lesion, such that he now knows that he has one of these brain 
lesions. Perhaps, for example, he comes across an article about these brain lesions in a 
reliable newspaper and researches the matter in reliable medical journals and on this basis 
comes to know that he is the victim of the brain lesion in question. Intuitively Alvin’s beliefs 
in the target mathematical propositions now qualify as knowledge. But notice that it is also 
true that Alvin has in this way integrated this belief-forming process within his cognitive 
character to a sufficient degree that his cognitive success is now primarily creditable to his 
cognitive agency, rather than being creditable to something external to his cognitive agency 
(albeit a factor which was under his skin, and hence in this sense internal). Like Temp, Alvin 
knows both that his beliefs in this regard are reliable and also what the source of this 
reliability is, and as a consequence he is able to take cognitive responsibility for his cognitive 
success in this regard.9  
There is thus an account of cognitive integration available which is compatible with 
both (COGAWEAK) and (COGASTRONG). This raises the question of which of these two 
accounts of the relationship between knowledge and cognitive ability that we should opt for. 
Relatedly, it also raises the question of whether there is a kind of cognitive integration which 
suffices for knowledge but which is only accounted for by (COGAWEAK). Interestingly, in the 
recent literature it has been (COGASTRONG) that has had the most adherents, with a view of 
roughly this sort endorsed by such figures as Ernest Sosa (1988; 1991; 2007), Linda 
Zagzebski (1996; 1999), and John Greco (2002; 2007; 2008; 2009).10 The reason why these 
epistemologists are attracted to this more robust account of the relationship between 
knowledge and cognitive ability is that it has a number of theoretical advantages over the 
weaker proposal. In particular, (COGASTRONG) offers an elegant and highly plausible account 
of knowledge while also casting light on some central problems in epistemology, such as 
concerning the nature of epistemic value.11 Of course, (COGASTRONG) only has these 
theoretical advantages if the proposal is true. Unfortunately, as we will now see, this proposal 
faces some pretty formidable obstacles, obstacles which are not faced by its competitor 
principle, (COGAWEAK). 
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The difficulties come from two directions. First, there are worries about the right-to-
left entailment in this biconditional, in that there seem to be cases where an agent’s cognitive 
success is primarily creditable to her cognitive agency but where she lacks knowledge 
nonetheless. The clearest examples in this respect concern cases where the agent’s belief in 
the target proposition is only luckily true on account of some unusual feature of the 
environment. This point gets missed by the proponents of (COGASTRONG) because they tend 
to focus on cases involving knowledge-undermining epistemic luck where the luck in 
question is not environmental in this way.  
Consider, for example, the following case involving ‘Roddy’, which follows the same 
basic model as the cases famously offered by Edmund Gettier (1963).12 Roddy looks into a 
field and using his highly reliable perceptual abilities he spots a sheep-shaped object. 
Accordingly, he forms a belief that there is a sheep in the field. Moreover, this belief is true, 
in that there is indeed a sheep in the field. The twist in the tale, however, is that what Roddy 
is looking at is not in fact a sheep at all, but rather a big hairy dog which is obscuring from 
view the real sheep hidden behind. His belief is thus only true as a matter of luck, in the sense 
that his true belief is unsafeviz., it could so very easily have been false. Intuitively, Roddy 
does not have knowledge of what he believes, even though his belief is true and the product 
of his reliable perceptual abilities. (COGASTRONG) offers a straightforward explanation of 
why this is the case. After all, the luck involved in the formation of Roddy’s true belief would 
surely suffice to ensure that his cognitive success would not be primarily creditable to his 
cognitive agency, but would be instead credited to the happy co-incidence that there 
happened to be a sheep in the field hidden from view behind the sheep-shaped object. 
So far so good for (COGASTRONG). The problem, however, is that not every form of 
knowledge-undermining epistemic luck is of this Gettier-style kind, with ‘environmental’ 
epistemic luck being a case in point. In Gettier-style cases of the sort just described 
something ‘intervenes’ between the agent’s cognitive ability and her cognitive success, albeit 
in such a way that it does not undermine the agent’s cognitive success. The Roddy case offers 
a vivid illustration of this phenomenon, in that Roddy thinks that he is looking at a sheep, and 
does truly believe as a result that there is a sheep in the field, but it is not a sheep that he is in 
fact looking at. Compare this case with an example where environmental epistemic luck is 
present.  
Consider the case of ‘Barney’ who uses his reliable perceptual faculties to form a 
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belief that there is a barn before him. This belief is true, in that there is a barn before him. 
Like the Roddy case, this belief is unsafe, and thus is only true as a matter of luck. Unlike the 
Roddy case, however, Barney really is looking at a genuine barn, and hence nothing has 
‘intervened’ between his cognitive ability and his cognitive success in the way that it does in 
the Roddy case. Instead, the source of the luck is entirely in the environment, in that Barney 
just happens to be in an environment where almost everything that looks like a barn is in fact 
a clever fake (a barn façade), and were Barney to have happened to look at any of these fakes 
then he would have continued to believe that what he is looking at is a barn regardless.13   
The problem posed by the Barney case for defenders of (COGASTRONG) is that unlike 
the Roddy case it does seem right to say that Barney’s cognitive success is primarily 
creditable to his cognitive agency, even though the luckiness of his true belief means that it is 
not in the market for knowledge. More generally, while environmental epistemic luck is just 
as knowledge-undermining as standard Gettier-style epistemic luck, it seems entirely 
compatible with the cognitive success in question being primarily creditable to the agent’s 
cognitive agency. After all, Barney really does employ his reliable perceptual faculties to see 
a genuine barn. The moral seems to be that there is sometimes more to having knowledge 
than having a cognitive success which is primarily creditable to one’s cognitive agency.  
A straightforward way for the proponent of (COGASTRONG) to respond to this problem 
would be to weaken the account slightly so that it is only offering a necessary condition for 
knowledge, rather than a necessary and sufficient condition. This would, in any case, make 
the strong account analogous to the weak account which itself only offers a necessary 
condition on knowledge. We thus get the following principle: 
 
(COGASTRONG*) If S knows that p then S’s true belief that p is the product of a reliable belief-forming 
process which is appropriately integrated within S’s cognitive character such that her 
cognitive success is primarily creditable to her cognitive agency. 
 
It should be clear that (COGASTRONG*) does not face the same problem as (COGASTRONG) 
when it comes to the Barney case, since it is open to the defender of (COGASTRONG*) to grant 
that Barney lacks knowledge on account of his failure to satisfy some further necessary 
condition which is required for knowledge (e.g., a safety condition).  
Unfortunately, even this weaker construal of the strong account of cognitive agency is 
not immune to counterexamples, for it seems that the account on offer is still too austere. The 
most straightforward examples which illustrate this concern cases where agents appropriately 
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trust the word of others and thereby gain testimonial knowledge.  
Consider the case of ‘Jenny’.14 Jenny gets off the train in an unfamiliar place and asks 
the first person she meets for directions. This person is indeed fully knowledgeable about the 
area and communicates this knowledge to our hero, who subsequently forms a true belief 
about the way to go. Does Jenny gain knowledge in this case? I think the natural answer is 
that she does, at least provided we read the details of the case in the right way. For I take it 
that we are assuming here that Jenny is in an epistemically friendly environment—it is not as 
if, for example, this town is renowned for its dishonest informants. Moreover, I take it that 
we are also reading into the case that Jenny is suitably responsive to epistemically relevant 
factors—it is not as if, for example, she would ask someone who would clearly not be a good 
informant (e.g., someone who was clearly a tourist), and it is not as if she would believe 
whatever she was told, even when it was obviously false. With these details of the case made 
explicit, then I think our intuitions are clear that Jenny does gain knowledge. Indeed, if Jenny 
does not gain knowledge in this case then, given that quite a lot of what we take ourselves to 
know we gained on a similar basis of trust, it follows that we have significantly less 
knowledge that we typically suppose ourselves to have. 
Crucially, however, it does not seem plausible to suppose that Jenny’s cognitive 
success is primarily creditable to her cognitive agency. After all, given that the bulk of the 
cognitive work here was done by Jenny’s informant, then it would seem that if any particular 
person is primarily creditable for Jenny’s cognitive success then it is her rather than Jenny.15 
Note that this is not to say that Jenny’s cognitive success is not to a significant degree 
creditable to her cognitive agency, since as we noted above we need to read the example such 
that Jenny’s cognitive success is substantively creditable to her cognitive agency before it 
counts as an intuitive case of knowledge in the first place (i.e., this is not a counterexample to 
the ability intuition). Still the point remains that Jenny’s cognitive success is not primarily 
creditable to her cognitive agency, and hence even (COGASTRONG*) is under threat. 
Indeed, once we diagnose what is going on in this case, we begin to see why the 
strong account of cognitive agency—and thus of the relationship between knowledge and 
cognitive ability—is so implausible (in both its forms). For the crux of the matter in the Jenny 
case is that in epistemically favourable environments knowledge is sometimes gained even 
though very little cognitive ability is exercised on the part of the subject. One can see this 
point by noting that had Jenny been in an epistemically unfavourable environment and 
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exhibited the same degree of cognitive ability then we would not have credited her with 
knowledge. There is thus an interplay between the extent of the cognitive ability required for 
knowledge and the epistemic favourableness of the environment for forming true beliefs in 
that case.  
That there is this interplay between cognitive ability and favourable environments is 
also demonstrated by the Barney case. For remember that the key feature of this case is that 
even despite the cognitive ability exhibited by Barney, such that his cognitive success is 
primarily creditable to his cognitive agency, he still does not count as having knowledge 
because of how epistemically unfriendly his environment is. In contrast, had the environment 
been friendlier—if, in particular, his belief so formed had not been subject to environmental 
epistemic luck—then he would have counted as having knowledge.  
The moral thus seems to be that while sometimes the exercise of very little cognitive 
ability can suffice for knowledge, equally sometimes the exercise of a great deal of cognitive 
ability can fail to suffice for knowledge, with in each case the crucial factor being the 
friendliness of the cognitive environment. But note that this point decisively favours a weak 
account of cognitive agency—and thus of the relationship between knowledge and cognitive 
ability—over its stronger counterparts. For what is not in doubt in the Jenny case is that 
(COGAWEAK) is satisfied, as noted above. Moreover, given that (COGAWEAK) only sets a 
necessary condition on knowledge, it is not called into question by the Barney case and cases 
like it which demonstrate that the exhibition of a high level of cognitive ability does not 
suffice for knowledge. Indeed, by the same token (COGAWEAK) is not called into question by 
cases involving standard Gettier-style luck either (like the Roddy case), for the natural 
explanation of what is going on here is that while the agent is indeed exhibiting a significant 
degree of cognitive ability, and is in addition cognitively successful, the epistemic luck 
involved means that the agent’s cognitive success is not creditable to her cognitive agency 
since it ensures that there is no appropriate connection between the agent’s cognitive agency 
and her cognitive success (i.e., such cases reinforce the ability intuition).16  
We are thus led to a relatively weak account of cognitive agency, and thus of 
cognitive ability, albeit one that demands far more of a belief-forming process if it is to be 
knowledge-conducive than that it be merely reliable. As we will see, such an account of 
cognitive agency in fact fits rather neatly with the extended cognition thesis. 
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3. THE EXTENDED COGNITION THESIS 
 
We noted above that the mere fact that the source of the reliability of an agent’s belief-
forming process is beneath the skin does not suffice to ensure that this process represents a 
cognitive ability on the part of the agenti.e., a cognitive process which can generate 
knowledge. What is important is rather that the reliable belief-forming process be integrated 
within the cognitive character of the agent such that the cognitive success in question is to a 
significant degree creditable to the agent’s cognitive agency. Now one might naturally infer 
from this that ‘cognitive ability’ is a sub-class of ‘reliable belief-forming process where the 
source of the reliability is completely under the skin of the agent’. Notice, however, that 
nothing that we have said so far supports this entailment since we have not even considered 
potential cases of cognitive ability where the latter characterisation does not hold. 
Nevertheless, it is common currency within epistemology to assume that something like the 
above entailment holds. In effect, what is being assumed here is that the extended cognition 
thesis is false. 
Now many epistemologists will hold that this is an entirely reasonable assumption, on 
the grounds that factors relevant to one’s cognition which are outwith one’s skin can play at 
most a causal or instrumental role. For example, that one uses a pen to work out a 
mathematical problem doesn’t make the pen part of the cognitive process—instead, it is just 
an instrument which helps the cognitive process to take place. We can cast this response in 
terms of the (COGAWEAK) thesis outlined above by observing that were one to gain 
knowledge of the mathematical proposition in question then we would credit one’s cognitive 
success to one’s cognitive agency (e.g., one’s skill in reasoning and so forth) rather than to 
the pen, which would be thought an incidental part of the cognitive process. That is, we 
would not consider the pen to be part of one’s cognitive agency. 
But of course intuitions like this about the pens used by mathematicians to gain 
mathematical knowledge need not be in conflict with the extended cognition thesis, for the 
claim by proponents of this thesis is only that in certain cases the cognitive process might 
genuinely extend beyond the skin. Indeed, the overarching dialectic of the seminal paper on 
extended cognition by Andy Clark & David Chalmers (1998) is in terms of a ‘why not’ 
question which is encapsulated in the following passage: 
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If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it to go on 
in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that 
part of the world is […] part of the cognitive process.” (Clark & Chalmers 1998, 8) 
 
Call this the parity principle. What informs this principle is the laudable egalitarian aim of 
avoiding irrelevant bias. After all, the philosophical tendency to treat cognitive processes as 
being exclusively located in the head (and thereby under the skin of the agent) is meant to be 
something that one is inexorably led to by reflecting on the very nature of cognitive 
processes, and not merely a self-fulfilling prejudice against extended cognition (such that any 
potential case of extended cognition is ruled-out by default because it extends beyond the 
skin of the agent). According to Clark & Chalmers, however, once one endorses this principle 
then one does seem to be committed to the possibility of extended cognition.17 
 Let’s begin by focussing on the case that Clark & Chalmers (1998) offer regarding 
Otto. Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease, and as a consequence he is gradually becoming 
aware that his memory is fading. In order to counter this, he starts carrying with him a 
notebook in which he records the kind of information that he requires on a day-to-day basis. 
On the traditional way of casting the matter, the notebook does not itself form part of Otto’s 
cognitive processes, even though it may be utilised by those processes. The challenge posed 
by the parity principle, however, is to explain why not. After all, if the information stored in 
the notebook were instead stored within Otto’s head in some way, and if that information 
were readily accessible to the same degree as the information in the notebook, then we would 
not hesitate to treat this information resource as part of Otto’s cognitive processes. The parity 
principle thus enjoins us to regard Otto’s notebook as part of the cognitive process, and so we 
get support for the extended cognition thesis.  
 Of course, not every case in which an agent uses a notebook in this way counts as a 
potential case of extended cognition. In particular, the Otto case is meant to exhibit two key 
features which set it apart from other cases to make it a good illustration of extended 
cognition. The first is that it is built into the case that the notebook is readily accessible and 
consistently available. Indeed, notice that we can strengthen the example on this score by 
having the notebook attached to Otto in some way—fixed to his arm, say—and designed in 
such a way that it is not hostage to circumstances (e.g., it can’t easily be damaged or get lost, 
and so on). If this condition were not met, then we would be far more inclined to treat the 
notebook as a mere instrument which assisted Otto on a particular occasion, rather than being 
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a genuine component of his cognitive processes.  
 The second feature that it is critical to the Otto case is that Otto has self-consciously 
decided to ‘extend’ his cognitive process in this way: aware that his (non-extended) memory 
is failing, this is the means by which he ensures that he can still get access to the information 
that he requires. Moreover, he has a standing endorsement of the information in the notebook. 
It is not as if, for example, Otto treats each piece of information he comes across with 
suspicion, and so seeks additional grounds for accepting it (which is not to say that he won’t 
sometimes treat the contents of the notebook with suspicion, but then that is true of one’s 
(non-extended) memories anyway). If this were the case, then this would again incline us to 
treat the notebook as a mere instrument employed in a cognitive process rather than as a bona 
fide part of the cognitive process.  
 The interesting question for our current purposes is what, if anything, the Otto case 
tells us about the relationship between knowledge and cognitive ability, and thus about 
cognitive agency. First off, note that Otto’s cognitive success does seem to be sufficiently 
creditable to his cognitive agency for him to satisfy (COGAWEAK), and there are thus no 
grounds on this score for denying him knowledgeindeed, intuitively Otto has knowledge of 
what he believes. But if we regard Otto’s cognitive processes as extended then it follows that 
Otto’s cognitive agency extends beyond his skin as well. It is this claim that we need to 
explore further. 
 
 
4. EXTENDED COGNITION AND COGNITIVE ABILITY 
 
The first thing to note about the Otto case is how Otto’s acquisition of the notebook, and his 
systematic use of it, represents a great deal of epistemic virtue on his part. A lesser cognitive 
agent—i.e., one who was less interested in gaining and retaining true beliefs about his 
environment—would have acquiesced in the loss of his (non-extended) memory and so 
accepted the epistemic consequences. Moreover, notice that the way in which Otto employs 
the notebook also reflects his epistemic virtue. An agent less concerned with epistemic goods 
would not, for example, go to the lengths that Otto goes to in order to ensure that this 
information resource is readily available to him but really would just use this notebook as a 
mere incidental aid to his cognition.  
 15 
More generally, it seems that what Otto is doing in employing the notebook in this 
way is—arguably, at least—integrating this information resource into his cognitive character 
in a relevant way for the extended cognitive process that results to genuinely count as one of 
his cognitive abilities. Recall that we noted above that Temp and Alvin could integrate their 
reliable belief-forming processes into their cognitive character, and thereby be in a position to 
acquire knowledge through these processes, by coming to know both that the target belief-
forming process is reliable and what the source of this reliability was. This is just what Otto 
has done, however, for while his (non-extended) memory is failing and so cannot be trusted, 
he knows that he can generally trust what the notebook tells him and why.  
In contrast, if Otto had no awareness at all of the source of the reliability of his belief-
forming processes, nor that it was reliable, then it is hard to see why we would now regard 
the true beliefs that he forms as a consequence as knowledge. Imagine, for example, that Otto 
is simply fitted with a device which provides him with reliable information about his 
environment and he unquestioningly consults it when necessary while never questioning the 
source of this information or its epistemic pedigree.18 It remains true that this is a reliable 
belief-forming process, but what no longer seems to be the case is that this is a belief-forming 
process which can generate knowledge. In particular, any true belief so formed seems to 
conflict with the ability intuition, as encoded in (COGAWEAK). This is because we would not 
deem Otto’s cognitive success as being to any significant degree creditable to his cognitive 
agency, but rather treat it as creditable to some feature external to his cognitive agency (i.e., 
the source of the reliability of the device in question). 
The moral seems to be that even cognitive processes that extend outside the skin of 
agent can count as part of one’s cognitive agency just so long as they are appropriately 
integrated within one’s cognitive character. This raises a number of interesting questions. 
To begin with, this is a good juncture at which to re-evaluate an issue we raised 
earlier regarding what is at minimum required for a reliable belief-forming process to become 
integrated within one’s cognitive character. As we noted above, coming to know both that the 
process is reliability and the source of this reliability will suffice in this regard, but this still 
leaves open the possibility that meeting a weaker requirement might sometimes suffice as 
well.  
One factor that seems salient in this regard is whether the source of the extended 
cognition was always present or whether it was added at a later juncture. In the Otto case we 
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clearly have an example of the latter, but suppose we imagine a variant of this case where the 
subject—let’s call him ‘Tempo’—is fitted from birth with a highly reliable device which 
records the ambient temperature and Tempo grows up in a culture where it is taken for 
granted that one consults one’s temperature-recording device in order to form beliefs about 
the ambient temperature. Interestingly, in a case like this it seems entirely unnecessary for 
Tempo to know that this is a reliable belief-forming process or what the source of the 
reliability is before he can gain knowledge via this process. For imagine that Tempo is a 
young child who has never even considered these questions. Wouldn’t we nonetheless 
straightforwardly regard him as gaining knowledge via this belief-forming process? 
Moreover, wouldn’t we regard Tempo’s cognitive success as being to a significant degree 
creditable to his cognitive agency, such that he satisfies (COGAWEAK)? If that’s right, 
however, then it seems that we do intuitively regard this reliable belief-forming process as 
being sufficiently integrated into Tempo’s cognitive character to count as one of his cognitive 
abilities. 
The intuition being elicited here is often cited in support of externalist theories of 
knowledge. According to such theories, one can have knowledge even while lacking good 
reflectively accessible grounds in favour of one’s belief in the known proposition. 
Externalists often point out that our innate reliable belief-forming processes, so long as they 
are functioning in an environment for which they are suited at any rate, can generate 
knowledge even if the agent concerned lacks any good reflectively accessible grounds in 
support of the beliefs so formed—for example, even if the agent lacks any good reflectively 
accessible grounds for thinking that the faculties in question are reliable.19  
Imagine, for example, a child employing her reliable perceptual faculties in such a 
way that she gains a true belief in an environment which is suited to the operation of these 
faculties. Clearly, we would not expect the child to have any meta-beliefs about the source of 
the reliability of her belief-forming processes, and hence she is not in a position to have any 
(meta-)knowledge in this regard. But wouldn’t we regard her cognitive success when 
employing her reliable perceptual faculties as properly creditable to her cognitive agency 
nonetheless? Indeed, wouldn’t we straightforwardly treat this cognitive success as an instance 
of knowledge? What the Tempo case seems to illustrate, and this is in keeping with Clark & 
Chalmers’s parity principle, is that what is important in this respect is only that the cognitive 
abilities are present from the offand are thus in this sense ‘innate’ (henceforth we will use 
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this term in this loose way)and not whether they are natural rather than artificially added to 
the agent.20  
When it comes to one’s innate reliable belief-forming processes, then, whether they 
are natural or artificially added, it seems that we intuitively relax what is needed for cognitive 
integration, for in these cases it is not required that the agent concerned know that these 
processes are reliable or why. It is an interesting question why this should be. If we allow 
innate reliable belief-forming processes to be knowledge-conducive even though the agent 
lacks knowledge of the source of this reliability, then why would we demand that Otto should 
have this knowledge before we treat him as a knower (or, for that matter, Alvin)? On 
reflection, however, it becomes clear that there is a natural explanation of this phenomenon.  
To begin with, note that in the Otto case there is a change in the agent’s cognitive 
processes, whereas in the Tempo case there is no change in this regard. The import of this is 
that such change cries out for the agent to take a reflective stance on the epistemic standing of 
this change, something that is not at all present in the Tempo case. For note that if we were to 
imagine Tempo being fitted with this device at a later stage, then we would require him to 
form a view as to the reliability of this process, and the source of this reliability, before we 
would regard the process as knowledge-conducive. 
Moreover, notice that the Tempo case does involve genuine cognitive integration. In 
order to see this point, suppose we re-describe the case so that the beliefs produced by the 
attached device sometimes conflict with the beliefs produced by his other faculties. For 
instance, suppose that sometimes this device tells him that the temperature is quite cold and 
yet he feels quite warm (and, say, observes a fire in the hearth). In treating Tempo as gaining 
knowledge of the temperature in the room as a result of being fitted with this device, we are 
surely supposing him to be an agent who would respond to such discrepancies were they to 
emerge. If this is not the case—if Tempo is happy to live with such apparent inconsistencies 
in his beliefs—then it ceases to be far so obvious that he does gain knowledge from this 
device. And notice the reason for this. For what Tempo demonstrates when he does respond 
appropriately to these apparent inconsistencies in his beliefs is that there is a weak kind of 
cognitive integration in play as regards even the belief-forming process involving this 
appended device. In contrast, if even this weak form of cognitive integration were not present 
then I think we would be reluctant to ascribe the relevant knowledge to Tempo. 
So when it comes to changes in one’s cognitive processes we tend to demand a form 
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of cognitive integration which is quite austere, while when it comes to innate cognitive 
processes, even where this involves extended cognitive processes, we tend to be more liberal 
and allow a much weaker sense of cognitive integration to be compatible with knowledge. 
We should expect that there is a continuum in play here, such that between these two 
extremes there is a range of cases which elicit mixed, or at least uncertain, intuitions.  
Suppose, for example, that there was a change in the agent’s cognitive processes, but 
that the agent was somehow shielded from being made aware of this, in such a way that she 
was not epistemically culpable (i.e., it wasn’t simply that she took no interest in what was 
happening to her). Consider, for example, a variant of the Tempo case where the device was 
added at a later juncture. Perhaps, for instance, Tempo* comes out of a coma with this device 
fitted and is somehow psychologically manipulated so that he comes to trust the information 
from this device while continuing to non-culpably be unaware that this device has been 
artificially implanted in him. Can Tempo* gain knowledge by using the reliable belief-
forming process that makes use of this device? To begin with at least, I take it that intuition is 
not on Tempo*’s side. After all, wouldn’t we simply credit his cognitive success to the 
machinations of those who fitted him with this device rather than (to any significant degree 
anyway) to his cognitive agency? If so, then he does not count as exhibiting a cognitive 
ability and so does not qualify for knowledge. 
Interestingly, however, as time goes on this intuition lessens. Imagine that Tempo* 
has had this device fitted for ten years, say. Does he still not qualify as having knowledge in 
the relevant respects? Clearly, the matter is now less certain. (And note that what goes here 
applies with equal force to the analogous variant of the Alvin case where the lesion in 
question is long-standing). But notice that we can explain what is going on here; why our 
intuitions are becoming less definitive. For assuming that Tempo* is an otherwise 
epistemically good fellow—i.e., even despite what cognitive impairment was brought about 
in order to unknowingly set him up with this extended belief-forming process in the first 
place—we would expect that he is displaying the kind of weak cognitive integration that we 
noted above was primarily relevant when it comes to innate reliable belief-forming processes. 
That is, there is now a track-record of beliefs formed via this process which have generally 
cohered with the beliefs formed via Tempo*’s cognitive abilities (and if they hadn’t cohered, 
we may suppose, then Tempo* would have spotted this and responded accordingly). With 
this point in mind it is not surprising that our intuitions are conflicted on this score. For while 
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we would ordinarily demand a stronger form of cognitive integration in this case, that there is 
this weak form of cognitive integration present surely has an influence on our intuitions in 
this regard. We can thus account for why it strikes us a penumbral case.  
So once we understand the ability intuition on knowledge along the lines set out by 
(COGAWEAK), then there seems a straightforward way of accommodating the extended 
cognition thesis within contemporary thinking about knowledge. Let me close by noting how 
(COGAWEAK) is in fact more conducive to the extended cognition thesis than either 
(COGASTRONG) or (COGASTRONG*). The reason for this is that once we move towards 
interpreting the ability intuition such that it demands that the agent’s cognitive success be 
primarily creditable to the agent’s cognitive character, then this might lessen our willingness 
to allow certain putative cases of extended cognition.  
Think again about the Otto case, for example. As we described the case above, Otto is 
solely responsible for setting-up and maintaining this new cognitive process, but clearly we 
can imagine variations of this case where this isn’t so. Suppose, for instance, that Otto’s wife 
helps him get set-up with this device, and plays an important role in ensuring that it functions 
effectively (in practice, of course, this would be quite likely). Adding this feature of the case 
does not prevent Otto from continuing to gain knowledge from this belief-forming process by 
the lights of (COGAWEAK), since it will still be true that Otto’s cognitive success is 
significantly creditable to his cognitive agency, even despite the involvement of a third-party 
in this regard. When it comes to either (COGASTRONG) and (COGASTRONG*), however, matters 
are not so clear. For given the involvement of a third-party is it still right to suppose that 
Otto’s cognitive success is primarily creditable to his cognitive agency? This is hard to judge. 
More generally, an advantage of (COGAWEAK) is that it can accommodate the thought 
that sometimese.g., when the agent is in a very epistemically friendly environmentvery 
little cognitive ability on the part of the subject can suffice for knowledge, and this is 
advantageous when it comes to accommodating cases of extended cognition. For we might 
suppose that part of what drives support for at least some cases of extended cognition is that 
the agent is in the relevant respects in an epistemically friendly environment such that 
although she is being assisted in various ways in attaining her cognitive goalse.g., by 
receiving help from other agents within that environmentshe is nonetheless exhibiting a 
sufficient degree of cognitive ability to count as a knower. Given that paradigm cases of 
extended cognition typically involve an agent adapting her current belief-forming processes, 
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we might expect that receiving help from a third-party is in practice quite a normal feature of 
cases of extended cognition (such ‘adaption’ is hard to do completely solo, we might 
suppose). But if that’s right, then it is inevitable that strong accounts of the relationship 
between cognitive success and cognitive agency are less suited to accommodating the 
extended cognition thesis.21 It is fortunate, then, that such accounts are independently 
problematic, as we demonstrated above.  
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
So far from being in conflict with contemporary thinking about knowledge, it seems that the 
extended cognition thesis may actually constitute a natural way of thinking about cognitive 
agency. In order to see this, however, we first needed to clarify what is involved in exhibiting 
a cognitive ability and thereby offer the right account of the relationship between knowledge 
and cognitive agency. As we have seen, there are independent reasons for favouring a 
relatively weak account in this regard. Interestingly, however, this weak account of cognitive 
agency is well-placed to accommodate cases of extended cognition. We thus have strong 
grounds for supposing that contemporary epistemology, through its commitment to the ability 
intuition, should incorporate the extended cognition thesis into the theory of knowledge.22 
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NOTES 
 
1  The locus classicus for the extended cognition thesis is Clark & Chalmers (1998). For some of the other key 
defences of extended cognition, see Clark (1998; 2006; 2007) and Rowlands (1999). See also Menary (2007). 
For two recent critical discussions of this thesis, see Adams & Aizawa (2008; cf. Adams & Aizawa 2001) and 
Rupert (2004; cf. Rupert 2009). See also Gertler (2007), though note that her focus is more on the related 
extended mind thesis than the extended cognition thesis. For a useful survey of the literature on extended 
cognition, see Cowart (2006). See Menary (2008) for a recent volume of articles on the extended mind thesis. 
2  For further discussion of safety and sensitivity, see Pritchard (2008b).  
3  The thesis that the envatted agent’s beliefs could nonetheless enjoy a high degree of epistemic support, at least 
to the extent that they are internalistically justified, is known as the ‘new evil genius intuition’. See Lehrer & 
Cohen (1983).  
4  For further discussion of the Temp case, see Haddock, Millar & Pritchard (2009, ch. 3). 
5  The Alvin case is adapted from one offered by Plantinga (1993b).  
6  Although there are various conceptions of cognitive character in the literaturesome of them quite 
demanding, some of them very undemandingwe don’t need to take a stance on this issue here, as I explain 
why below (see endnote 7). For a very undemanding conception of cognitive character, one cast along broadly 
reliabilist lines, see Greco (e.g., 2000). For a very demanding conception of cognitive character, one cast along 
neo-Aristotelian lines, see Zagzebski (1996).  
7  It is for this reason that we don’t need to engage with the detailed debate about the nature of cognitive 
character here (see endnote 6), since we can bypass this discussion for our purposes by simply focussing on the 
question of whether we would treat the agent’s cognitive success as appropriately creditable to her cognitive 
agency. Where the agent’s cognitive success passes this test, then we will treat it as being due to a reliable 
belief-forming process that is appropriately integrated within the agent’s cognitive character, and thus due to 
cognitive ability; where the agent’s cognitive success fails to pass this test, then we will not treat it as being due 
to cognitive ability. In this way we can gain a good enough grip on what constitutes cognitive character without 
having to engage with the wider epistemological discussion of this notion, and we can thereby simplify our 
discussion. 
8  It might also be necessary to add that this new knowledge should cohere with the other relevant beliefs that 
the agent holds, though in most casesand possibly all casesthis will be entailed by the acquisition of the 
new knowledge anyway, thereby making the addition of this further clause redundant. I comment further on this 
point belowsee endnote 9. 
9  I noted above in endnote 8 that one might be tempted to add a coherence clause to the strong account of 
cognitive integration on offer, such that the new knowledge that the agent acquires coheres with other relevant 
beliefs he holds. In most cases, however, if not all of them, this clause will be redundant, as the Temp and Alvin 
cases illustrate. After all, it is hard to see how Temp or Alvin could acquire the new knowledge in question if 
the new beliefs they form do not cohere with other relevant beliefs that they hold. In the Temp case, for 
example, if Temp has, say, independent reason to doubt the reliability of the thermostat that the helper uses, then 
won’t this undermine his knowledge that this belief-forming process is reliable? Still, I leave it an open question 
whether the addition of this clause may be necessary to deal with certain cases.  
10  Arguably, one could add Plantinga (1993a) to this list. Note that in earlier work Greco (e.g., 1999; 2000) 
advanced a conception of the relationship between knowledge and cognitive ability which was much more in 
keeping with (COGAWEAK).  
11  See Greco (2009) for a clear statement of the theoretical advantages of this account of knowledge, 
particularly with regard to its putative application to the topic of epistemic value. 
12  This example is adapted from one offered by Chisholm (1977, 105). 
13  This case was originally offered by Goldman (1976), although he credits the example to Carl Ginet.  
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14  This example is due to Lackey (2007), though note that it was originally designed to illustrate a slightly 
different point. 
15  Alternatively, one might regard this as a case of distributed cognition such that the cognitive system 
comprising of both Jenny and her informant should be regarded as primarily creditable for Jenny’s cognitive 
success. Although I believe that there are cases of distributed cognition, I take no stand here on whether this 
case falls into this category since the important point for our purposes is just that Jenny’s cognitive success is 
not primarily creditable to her. 
16  For further discussion of weak versus strong accounts of cognitive agency, see Haddock, Millar & Pritchard 
(2008, ch. 2) and Pritchard (2008a; 2008c; 2009; forthcoming). 
17  There are worries about the parity principle, not least of which that it is side-steps other apparently defining 
marks of the cognitive, such as that it involves some sort of non-derived, and not merely (temporally) 
immediate, access to information. For some recent fine-grained discussions of the notion of the cognitive on this 
score, see Adams & Aizawa (2001), Clark (2007; 2008), Menary (2006; 2007), Rowlands (2009), and Rupert 
(2004). 
18  Note that I am simply talking here of a device which supplies Otto with reliable information, rather than a 
‘memorial’ device in which Otto himself can record information for his later self. The problem with thinking of 
the device along memorial lines is that one then needs to tackle the vexed question of how Otto can both record 
information in this notebook and retrieve information from it without having any view of the epistemic pedigree 
of the information. (After all, if his memory is so bad that he doesn’t remember entering this information, then 
in what sense is he a believer at all? But if he has any memory of entering the information, then that would 
surely have an effect on the epistemic pedigree he assigns to the information so retrieved).    
19  The locus classicus for discussions of epistemic externalism is Goldman (1986). See also Plantinga (1993a; 
1993b).  
20  Note that in talking of the reliable belief-forming processes as being present “from the off” I am glossing 
over an important complication in this regard, which is those belief-forming processes that we are primed for 
‘from the off’, but which are only activated at a later point, if at all. The paradigm example in this regard is the 
(apocryphal) example of the so-called ‘chicken-sexer’ cognitive ability much beloved by epistemic externalists. 
For while agents are not born with chicken-sexing abilities, the idea runs that they are primed for such abilities, 
should they encounter suitable further stimuli (in this case, spending plenty of time around chicks). For our 
purposes I think we can safely set reliable belief-forming processes of this type to one side, independently 
interesting though they are. For further discussion of chicken-sexer cases, and their relevance to the 
externalism/internalism debate in epistemology, see Pritchard (2005, passim).  
21  See Vaesen (2009) for a persuasive argument against a strong conception of the ability principle by appeal to 
the extended cognition thesis.  
22  I am grateful to Evan Butts, Andy Clark, Luciano Floridi, Sandy Goldberg, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis 
Palermos, Tom Roberts, Ernie Sosa and Krist Vaesen for helpful discussions on this topic. My research into this 
area has been supported by the award of a Philip Leverhulme Prize.  
